Approved For Release 2009/02/02 : CIA-RDP85B00652R000100060064-9 Directorate of Intelligence Office of African and Latin American Analysis 8 JUN 1983 NOTE FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence Bob, Attached, per your recent request, are our paper on "The Military 25X1 comments on a Consequences of Military Rule in Sub-Saharan Africa" We found this a useful paper that puts together in a 25X1 comprehensive way several aspects of military rule in Africa. It will serve as a convenient reference work for our analysts. 25X1 Director

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DIA review completed.





Major General Walter R. Longanecker, Jr. Special Assistant for Education and Training Directorate for Attaches and Training Defense Intelligence Agency Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Maj. Gen. Longanecker:

Thank you for forwarding a monograph on "The Military Consequences of Military Rule in Sub-Saharan Africa" produced in connection with your Defense Academic Research Support Program. Our analysts found this to be well-reasoned, comprehensive, and effectively organized. We believe it made especially good use of the corpus of writing on the military in Africa—a favorite subject of academia and other observers of Africa. In addition, we believe the paper accurately reflects growing evidence that military governments are not immune—as was once thought—to the political and economic pressures that undermine the stability of civilian governments.

Our analysts found a number of points to be thought provoking. Especially interesting were the judgments that the acquisition of additional weapons by military regimes is usually a poor second on the priority list to improving the standard of living of officers and troops, and that a high level of regional tensions is a much more useful indicator of arms acquisition than the type of regime. Without contesting the basic judgments, we believe the paper deemphasizes too much the inclination of military regimes to acquire new weapons. In addition, we would posit that a government's economic position and a country's economic health are equal to regional tensions as factors that influence a military regime to acquire new weapons.

In your discussion of different types of conditions of military rule, we found especially interesting the section on junior officer/NCO controlled governments. We believe these types of coups are likely to become more numerous in the years to come. As the world recession has accelerated deteriorating economic conditions in the resource poor and nearly bankrupt countries of Sub-Saharan Africa, many governments have had to curb development plans and impose politically difficult austerity measures. As a

result, there has been a further erosion of support for already weak governments, and demands for radical change are gaining ground among the lower level military ranks and other elements of society that see themselves as have nots.

In sum, we found this a useful paper and come essentially to the same conclusion: military governments are not necessarily better equipped or more able than civilian governments to resolve the political, economic, and social problems that plague most African countries. Moreover, the longer the military tries to cling to power in the absence of clear goals or means to achieve its goals, the more vulnerable it becomes to debilitating internal cleavages that argue for a transfer of power to civilians lest the army collapse into indiscipline.

Sincerely,

Robert M. Gates
Deputy Director for Intelligence

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SUBJECT: Letter to Major General Walter R. Longanecker, Jr.

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
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DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

DDI- 3639/83

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29 APR 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR (DISTRIBUTION LIST)

SUBJECT: Defense Academic Research Support Program (DARSP)

- 1. In February 1982 DIA announced the inauguration of the Defense Academic Research Support Program (DARSP) to obtain unclassified, publishable research studies on key socio-political factors affecting the stability of the Third World. Devised to support analysis within the General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP) community, one of the principal objectives of this program is an expanded relationship between GDIP analysts and academic area specialists and experts. Our initial research emphasis was on Sub-Saharan Africa.
- 2. On 8 February 1983 we forwarded to you a monograph on "Factors Affecting the Role and Employment of Peacekeeping Forces in Africa South of the Sahara," the first research study completed under the DARSP. We enclose a second monograph on "The Military Consequences of Military Rule in Sub-Saharan Africa." We encourage your careful review and appraisal of these studies, not only for their information, interpretations and assessments, but for their value as vehicles to stimulate working analyst-scholar relationships. If analysts find it desirable, contacts may be arranged with the authors of the studies, via W. R. Longanecker, Jr., Special Assistant for Education and Training, Directorate for Attaches and Training (AT-SA) (694-4489 or AV 224-1385/2033).
- 3. Other reports will follow, and we ask that they be accorded equal consideration so that we can properly evaluate the DARSP and plan its future.
- 4. We appreciate the comments so far received on the first monograph, and request by 31 May 1983 the comments from those addressees who have not yet supplied them. Additionally, we request your comments on the second monograph not later than 15 June 1983. The comments need not be lengthy. Please address them to Mr. Longanecker.

1 Enclosure a/s

DISTRIBUTION LIST:

See page 2

